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BULGARIA'S RÔLE IN THE BALKANS

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The Balkan peninsula has been called the cock-pit of Europe; the Sarayevo outrage, which precipitated the present tragic war, has shown that the Balkans are, even more truly, Europe's percussion-cap. Servia caused the explosion, and now that Turkey has entered the fray, the question of what Bulgaria will do is causing a deal of speculation in European chancellories. Triple Entente and Dual Alliance, knocking today at the double-hinged doors of Bucharest, are referred to Sofia for needed information, without which Rumania appears disinclined to move either toward Bessarabia or towards Transylvania and Bukovina. In maintaining herself a firm, even an obstinate neutrality, and so compelling the neutrality of Rumania, Bulgaria has succeeded so far in keeping the Balkans from becoming the battle ground of Russ and Moslem. Omniscient newspaper scribes have been assuring us that Bulgaria would join Russia's side the moment Turkey should strike; others have prophesied with equal assurance that Bulgaria and Turkey would strike at the Russ simultaneously, drawing Rumania along with them. Whatever the future may bring, certain it is that the attitude of scarcely any state in the eastern and Mediterranean area (Italy, of course, excepted) concerns the diplomats of the warring nations so much as Bulgaria's possible attitude, a radical change in which may alter quite perceptibly the complexion of the Eastern campaign.

True it is that, while Bulgaria's policy of neutrality has been dominated largely by her desire for peace, that has not been the sole determinant. The factors which decide Bulgaria's present attitude can not be truly appreciated without freshly calling to mind the rôle which Bulgaria has,

for the last quarter of a century, played and aspires to play in southeastern Europe, a rôle emphasized so clearly, and indeed so tragically, by her conduct during the Balkan wars.

And now I feel that I am entering upon an uninviting topic. For the Balkan wars occasioned a literature of horrors and atrocities which has hardened America's heart against everything Balkan. The average American has made up his mind that the Balkan nations are one and all bestial, bloodthirsty barbarians, and he is too disgusted with the vile *specie Balcanica* to draw any distinctions between its several varieties.

The aim of the present paper is not to add a new recital of horrors to the already noisome collection. Nor is it my object to offer an impartial history of the Balkan wars from a Bulgarian point of view. For many months, while the world's finger of undeserved scorn was pointed at the Bulgarian nation, Bulgaria felt that the mere denial of unsubstantiated charges was useless, for *qui s'excuse s'accuse*. And now, months after the International Commission of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has published its Report Concerning the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars—the facts recorded virtually vindicating Bulgaria—I feel that any Bulgarian's defence of his country's conduct during the recent wars is quite needless. The International Commission's Report is available to anyone seeking to acquaint himself with the actual course of events. It leaves no reasonable doubt of the fact that, whatever the political and diplomatic status of Macedonia may be, ethnically it has been and is decidedly Bulgarian, and that in spite of the active Servian and Greek propagandas; and that the war against Turkey, at least as far as Bulgaria was concerned, was merely the culmination of a revolutionary movement extending through many years and having as its aim the liberation of the native Bulgars whom the Berlin Congress handed back to the Sultan at the time of the partition of the Bulgarian folk.

In regard to the matter of atrocities the cumulative effect of the evidence assembled in the Report leads to only one

conclusion: that, whereas Sherman's definition of war was indeed terribly exemplified in the Balkan wars, the Bulgarian excesses were in the nature of reprisals, "in each case the Bulgarians acted under provocation, and in each case the accusation is grossly exaggerated, but their reprisals were none the less lawless and unmeasured." The facts, the Report continues, "even on the worst view which may be taken of them, are far from supporting the general statements of some Greek writers, that the Bulgarians in their withdrawal from southern Macedonia and western Thrace followed a general policy of devastation and massacre." The orders and spirit of the Bulgarian army were against atrocities. But one must read the ghastly chapters in the Report devoted to Serbia and Greece in order to be convinced that the Serb-Greek campaign in Macedonia was from the very start a campaign of denationalizing the native Bulgar population. The Greek campaign against Bulgaria in the summer of 1913 was a war of brutally exterminating everything Bulgarian in Macedonia; this plan was carried out "by the King's orders," as the Greek soldiers themselves write to their kinsfolk. "The Greek army" the Report states, "inaugurated the second war by the deliberate burning of a Bulgarian town. Wherever the peasants ventured to await the arrival of the Greek troops in their villages the village was sacked and the women violated before it was burned, and non-combatants were wantonly butchered, sometimes in twos or threes, sometimes in larger numbers. The broad fact that the whole of this Bulgarian region, for a distance of about one hundred miles, was devastated and nearly every village burned, admits of no denial. Systematically and in cold blood the Greeks burned one hundred and sixty Bulgarian villages and destroyed at least 16,000 Bulgarian homes. The figures need no commentary" (pp. 94, 95, 99, 102, 103-104, 106).

No pleading and no arguments which a Bulgarian could bring forward in self-defence can make any more conclusive the truth pointed out by the Report of this impartial International Commission. Bulgaria is content to rest her

case. The Commission's Report by no means leaves the Bulgar soldier blameless, but it points out a distinction between the conduct of Bulgaria and that of her allies which is clear enough for all who are still open to conviction.

The actual course of the Balkan allies' war against Turkey, which I shall not trace here in any detail, may be well understood from the following facts. The figures quoted below indicate the losses of Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece in the war against the Turk and their respective gains in territory and population, when, after Bulgaria had exhausted her strength in crushing almost singlehanded the main armies of the common enemy, her allies broke their own treaties with her, incited Rumania to violate the Petersburg protocol and Turkey the treaty of London, and conspired to overwhelm her on all sides in the ignoble war of 1913.

	LOSSES IN		TERRITORY IN SQUARE MILES		AP- PROX. PER CENT OF GAIN	POPULATION		AP- PROX. PER CENT OF GAIN
	Killed	Wounded	Before the war	After the war		Before the war	After the war	
Bulgaria	30,024	53,465	33,647	43,310	28	4,337,516	4,467,006	3
Servia	5,000	18,000	18,650	33,891	82	2,911,701	4,527,992	06
Greece	1,730	10,116	25,014	41,933	68	2,666,000	4,363,000	64

Before the war, the populations and areas of Servia and Greece combined scarcely exceeded the population and area of Bulgaria. Now Servia and Greece are separately Bulgaria's equal, and if Servia is still smaller in area, she exceeds her in population.

These are melancholy figures, but the worst from Bulgaria's point of view is yet to be told, for the war of liberation, which the Balkan nations declared against the Turk and the outcome of which was decided by Bulgarian valor and Bulgarian blood, has ended in subjugating 1,198,000 Bulgars, putting 286,000 under Rumanian, 315,000 under Greek, and 597,000 under Servian rule. That to Bulgaria is the most terrible result of the war: instead of liberating, it has enslaved.

And the enslavement of Macedonia is literal, actual.

Even now, while 'heroic little Servia' is fighting for her existence, the Bulgar natives (which before the war formed 80 per cent of the Christian population of Macedonia and composed the bulk of the population in 36 of the 53 towns, and in 2,239 of the 2,704 Macedonian villages) are subjected, in the regions seized by Servia and Greece, to a systematic reign of terror, aiming at suppression of all racial consciousness, the elimination by exile or imprisonment or by other ways more obvious and sinister of the more intelligent natives, the closing of the native schools and churches, the stifling of all ideals and all aspirations—in a word the eventual denationalization of Macedonia.

Every town and village from Uskub to the Kostur villages, and from the Lake of Ochrid to the river Mesta is today the witness of this crucifixion of a liberty-loving people. The native Bulgarian population in the districts seized by Servia and Greece was suffered even by "the unspeakable Turk" to support its own schools; it had 60 secondary schools, 767 primary schools, with 1,197 teachers and 39,257 pupils. These schools were not the result of an alien propaganda, using education as a means to ethnic proselytism, as was the case for the most part with the Greek and Servian schools in Macedonia.

The Servian case in Macedonia is, if anything, even weaker ethnically than the Greek, for whereas the neo-Hellenizing propaganda is centuries old, the systematic Serbization of the Uskub regions dates only from yesterday. The opening of Serb schools in Macedonia was encouraged by the Porte, just as the spread of Greek schools had been, on the principle of *divide et impera*. In 1896 Hafiz Pasha, *vali* of Kossovo, removed from office the *kaimakam* of Shtip for not using force in opening a Serb school in that town, in which there were no Serb or Greek inhabitants. The native population opposed all the efforts of the *vali* himself, but if Hafiz Pasha did not succeed in putting a Serb school in Shtip, he dotted the Bulgar districts of Kumanovo, Kotchana, and Kratovo with centers of Servian propaganda. In many cases the schools were without pupils; the Serb school at Egri Palanka had three teachers and one pupil.

Shtip, Kotchana, Kratovo, and Egri Palanka are all under Serb rule today—and the process of their Serbization is directed from Belgrade.

From a thousand examples illustrating similar Greek efforts to suppress the racial consciousness of the native Bulgarian population in Macedonia, only one will be cited. I select the case of Kukush, because the Bulgarian army was charged by Constantine of Greece with the pillage of this town and the massacre of its "Greek" population. Kukush had 10,360 Bulgarian inhabitants, Exarchists, Catholics, or Protestants by religion, including 40 "Serb" proselytes, but no Greeks. Yet government intrigue resulted in the opening by force of a Greek school at Kukush ten years ago, which had four pupils. The Bulgarian secondary school in the Greek-inhabited town of Kostur, however, was closed in spite of the fact that it had more than forty pupils and that it was the center of a village district numbering 57,400 Bulgars against 11,075 Greeks. In the year 1904 the Turkish government, instigated by the Greek patriarchate, refused school-permits to more than 100 Bulgarian villages in the *kazas* of Enidje-Vardar, Kostur, Voden, Lerin, Monastir, Serres, Zihna, and Salonica.

The Bulgarian schools in Macedonia have been the result of a long, bitter struggle for national life. They are not centers of alien propaganda; they are native schools, supported and taught by natives. In the year 1902, of 1,239 professors and teachers in the Bulgar schools in Macedonia, 4 were foreigners, 15 were Bulgars born in Bulgaria, and 1,220 were Bulgars born in Macedonia. At the same time there were in the schools of free Bulgaria no less than 450 Macedonian-born teachers. Macedonia has sent to Bulgaria all her intelligent sons who could not endure Turkish tyranny. Bulgaria is the natural asylum of those men; they will continue to seek refuge in Bulgaria from the two new reigns of terror, Greek and Servian; they will be Bulgars in Bulgaria, or in America, or wherever they are forced to emigrate, until the day comes when they can be Bulgars in their homeland of Macedonia.

To delay the coming of this day means systematically

to rob Macedonia of all which makes for her progress and culture, to leave in the country only the stolid, brutalized mass, and to perpetuate its brutal stolidity. Whether civilized humanity will allow such a crime to be committed in the Balkans is a matter for speculation. Certain it is that Servia and Greece do not intend to allow the native population of Macedonia to remain intelligent and Bulgar.

The attitude of Greece toward the native Bulgarian population in the Macedonian districts which she occupied has from the very start been the attitude of conquerors, indeed of exterminators. The first move on the part of the Greek authorities was to compel the native Bulgar population to call itself Greek, to declare its loyalty to the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, and to substitute the Greek for the Bulgar language in its church services. Cajolery, threats of imprisonment, moral and financial pressure, and physical torture were employed in dozens of villages and towns in southern Macedonia. In many places a census was taken, the natives being asked if they were "Greeks or Schismatics," or whether they were Christians, *i.e.*, Greeks. Those who refused to call themselves Greeks were threatened with exile. To be sure, the peasants in the village Grubevtsi, forced to sign a declaration that they were Greeks, had to have the declaration translated into Bulgarian, and unable to sign their names in Greek, were inscribed *en masse* by a Greek notary public; and in the village of Pilorik, compelled to attend a Greek liturgy in their native church, the Bulgars could not provide a Greek-singing choir, and ten Greek soldiers from Enidje-Vardar had to be imported. But these facts did not check the neo-Hellenizers; their object was to banish the Bulgarian language from school and church. The priest or the teacher who insisted on using the Bulgarian language was imprisoned. In the district of Enidje-Vardar alone the Greeks closed the Bulgar schools and churches in fourteen villages. On March 23, 1913, the priest A. Shishkoff was imprisoned in Kojani for collecting subscriptions to the Bulgarian Red Cross from the Bulgarian Chrupish villagers. On June 4, 1913, six Bulgars of Gurdobor, charged with singing Bulgarian songs, were

subjected to torture. And there are hundreds of other distinct, authenticated instances of such spiritual and physical oppression. All the more intelligent Bulgars were imprisoned or exiled; 2,000 of the representative Bulgars in southern Macedonia were under arrest. It was a crime to speak the Bulgarian language in public and the bulk of the natives knew no other. All this was taking place while Greece was professedly Bulgaria's loyal ally, and while Bulgaria was fighting the common enemy all alone before Tchatalja and Gallipoli. What takes place now that Greece rules these Bulgar lands can well be imagined.

The Servian plan is as terribly simple. As a Macedonian Hamlet put it: "The Bulgar native of Macedonia has two ways open, to be a Serb, or not to be!" But the recital of a thousand harrowing instances cannot possibly be as convincing as the mere quoting from the Servian "decree for public security" adopted on October 4, 1913, setting forth the manner in which the Black George has been governing the "liberated" provinces of Macedonia. The translation is that quoted in the Carnegie Report:

"Any person who uses an explosive *without any evil intention*, shall be punished by five years' penal servitude (Article 11). Any attempt at rebellion against the public powers is punishable by five years' penal servitude. The decision of the police authorities, published in the respective communes, is sufficient proof of the commission of crime. If the rebel refuses to give himself up as prisoner within ten days from such publication, he may be put to death by any public or military officer (Article 2). Any person accused of rebellion in terms of the police decision and who commits any crime shall be punished with death. If the accused person himself gives himself up as a prisoner into the hands of the authorities, the death penalty shall be commuted to penal servitude for ten to twenty years, always provided that the commutation is approved by the tribunal." (Article 3). The native Macedonians are vicariously punishable, Chinese fashion, for the offences of others. Thus "where several cases of rebellion occur in a commune and the rebels do not return to their homes within ten days from the police

notice, the authorities have the right of deporting their families whithersoever they may find convenient. Likewise the inhabitants of the houses in which armed persons or criminals in general are found concealed, shall be deported. The heads of the police shall transmit to the Prefecture a report on the deportation procedure, which is to be put in force immediately. The Minister of the Interior shall, if he think desirable, rescind deportation measures (Article 4)." The Macedonian Bulgars are required to be spies under penalty of the law. "Anyone who knows a malefactor and does not denounce him to the authorities shall be punished by five years' penal servitude (Article 16)." And finally, by Article 26, "the Prefects have the right to prescribe in their name police measures to safeguard the life and property of those subject to their administration. They shall fix penalties applicable to those who refuse to submit to such measures. The penalty shall consist of a maximum period of three years' imprisonment or of a pecuniary fine up to a thousand *dinars* (francs). The edicts of the Prefects shall come into force immediately, but the Prefects are bound to communicate them at once to the Minister of the Interior."

Aside from this code, which puts autocratic Czardom to shame, the government of Belgrade has not only closed all the Bulgarian native schools, but has imposed heavy fines on all natives whose children do not attend the Serb schools, and a double fine on all natives whose children attend non-Serb schools. The unspeakable Turk never practised such exquisite tyranny—it has remained for the Belgrade "liberators" to add the Christian scorpions to the Moslem whips, as if to show precisely what sentiments they harbor towards the natives of Macedonia whom they proclaim to the world as "veritable Serbs."

Now it may be asked, why should Macedonian natives be so obstinately Bulgar in their aspirations? Why don't they turn Serb or Greek, as Belgrade and Athens demand, and end this ethnic nightmare? This question must be answered by another question. Will it be for the ultimate advancement of Balkan civilization if Serb and Greek

should succeed in their projects, should eliminate all the freer Bulgar spirits from Macedonia, and successfully achieve the denationalization of the rest? Will it be a step forward for humanity if Bulgarian Macedonia becomes Servian or Greek? In other words, are the civilization, spirit, and ideals of Bulgaria's neighbors superior to her own?

To answer this latter question is to enter into comparisons, which are proverbially odious, but sometimes necessary. To the Greek, the Bulgarians have ever been Vulgar-ians, Scyths; the Serb has complacently spoken of himself as the civilizer of non-Serb Southern Slavdom, notably of his benighted neighbor to the east; the Rumanian has proclaimed on every European bazaar his mission as the *Kulturträger* of the Balkans. All of Bulgaria's neighbors, while disputing among themselves for the palm of cultural leadership, have been accustomed to treat the Bulgarians as barbarians, half-Tartars, rustic churls.

Facta, non verba. Educational statistics of the four Balkan states may serve to introduce us to the actualities. To confirm these figures, the reader is referred to *The Statesman's Year Book* for 1913, F. Buisson's *Nouveau Dictionnaire de Pédagogie*, 1911, the *Minerva Jahrbuch* for 1911-12, and the official report, published 1910, of the Bulgarian Ministry of Public Instruction.

Let us compare first the public school systems of the four nations, excluding the Moslem population, which is proverbially unschooled. For every 1,000 non-Moslems in Servia there were, in the year 1910, 50 pupils attending the public primary and secondary schools of Servia. The corresponding figures for Rumania were 55, for Greece 94, for Bulgaria 109. The last item becomes all the more striking when it is remembered that Rumania and Servia had organized school systems long before independent Bulgaria was born in 1878, and that for centuries during the undisputed sway of the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople the Turkish government allowed only Greek schools in the Balkans.

But if a nation's general standards of education are a gauge of its civilization, the education of its women is a

doubly sure index. Of the 145,973 pupils in Servia, 31,938, or less than 23 per cent, were girls. Of the 252,880 pupils in the public primary and secondary schools of Greece, 65,162, or less than 26 per cent were girls. Of the 405,472 pupils in Bulgaria, the girls numbered 151,031, or more than 36 per cent. I have no statistical data covering this point for Rumania, but the following comparison of secondary schools will show, I think, how the Rumanian woman fares culturally.

The 1,136 girls enrolled in the secondary public schools of Rumania form less than 8 per cent of the total number of students. In Greece, the 1,221 girls in the secondary public schools form barely 4 per cent of the total. In Servia of a total of 9,899, the 2,335 girls form less than 24 per cent. In the public gymnasia and progymnasia of Bulgaria there are 38,585 pupils; of these, 12,382 or 32.6 per cent, or almost one-third, are girls. The Serb is the poorest educator in the Balkans, treating his boys and girls with fairly equal indifference, and a comparison of the last two tables shows also just where Greek and Rumanian public school education of women usually ends: with the primary schools.

If we turn next to higher education, the data are no less striking. The University of Bucharest, Rumania, registers 3,398 students, of whom 203, or less than 6 per cent, are women. In the University of Belgrade, Servia, only 65, or barely over 6 per cent, of the 960 students are women. I have found no record of any women students whatever at the Greek National University at Athens, with its enrollment of over 2,800. The University of Sofia, Bulgaria, is attended by 371 women, forming over 22 per cent of the total. Bulgaria is the only Balkan country in which womankind partakes normally of the advantages of public education: 37.5 per cent in the primary schools, 32.6 per cent in the secondary schools, 22.2 per cent in the university. And the tendency is to increase these percentages; the percentage of girls in primary schools, which today is about 38, was only 22 in 1888.

The position of girls and women in the educational life of the various Balkan nations may be understood also from

the following table. Of Servia's 1,305 primary public schools, 1,151 are for boys and 154 for girls. Greece has 3,418 public primary schools, of which 1,224 are for boys, 623 are for girls, and 1,571 are for both sexes. Bulgaria during the year 1908-09 had 18 primary public schools for boys only, not a single one for girls only, and 3,334 "mixed schools" for boys and girls together.

This universal policy of coeducation in the Bulgarian primary schools is characteristic of the Bulgar attitude toward womankind generally. A mere glance at the Greek secondary public school statistics (30,178 boys; 1,221 girls), will make unnecessary any further discussion of this matter touching Greece, nor is there any coeducation whatever in the Rumanian or Servian secondary schools. In Bulgaria, as early as 1900, secondary school coeducation was to be found in 14 department centers and in many large villages and small towns. In 1908-09 Bulgaria had 22 progymnasia (incomplete high schools) for boys, 22 for girls, and 50 for both sexes. Coeducation is farther advanced in Bulgaria than in most European countries. In the Bulgarian gymnasium young married men instruct girls seventeen and eighteen years old, and in the progymnasia young women are often the teachers of young men. I am not here urging the educational wisdom of the coeducation policy; its success, however, is conditioned by and indicates a certain relation between the sexes, which exists in Bulgaria and does not exist in any other country in Eastern Europe.

We turn now to the illiteracy statistics of the four nations. During the period of Turkish dominion, up to 1878, Bulgaria was as illiterate as it is possible for a country to be. In 1887 Bulgaria's illiteracy was 89.3 per cent (82.9 per cent for the men, 95.9 per cent for the women). Eighteen years later, in 1905, the illiteracy had been reduced to 72.1 per cent (59.3 per cent for the men, 85.3 per cent for the women). These figures are encouraging as they stand, but they require some interpretation, which will show how misleading the general statistics of illiteracy are concerning Bulgaria.

In the first place the population of the country before the Balkan wars (4,337,516) included some 576,014 Turks

and Gypsies, and a considerable number of Tartars, all of whom are still 96 per cent illiterate (and their women 98.4 per cent illiterate) in spite of Bulgaria's efforts to civilize them. In the 24 Bulgarian gymnasia (complete high schools, which are open to Turks and Bulgars alike) with a total enrollment of 11,650 boys and 5,953 girls, there were in 1908-09 only five Moslem boys and not a single Moslem girl. These people are in Bulgaria what the Indians and negroes are in the United States. If the degree of intelligence of the Bulgarian people is to be discovered, these illiterate Moslems should be excluded; and then we find that the general illiteracy of the remaining population was in 1905 67.9 per cent, and of the population above seven years of age 60 per cent. This figure is lower than that of most Eastern European countries.

But it also is misleading. Bulgaria had her first chance at educating her people only thirty-six years ago. Previous to 1878, as already stated, Bulgaria could not help being illiterate. Even today 81.1 per cent of the total population over thirty-five years of age can neither read nor write (68 per cent of the men, 95.4 per cent for the women). In order to understand the real standard of intelligence of the free Bulgarian nation of today, therefore, we must examine the illiteracy of the non-Moslem population seven to thirty-five years of age. The figures for 1905 show on this basis an illiteracy of 33 per cent (about 22 per cent for the men and 43 per cent for the women). When we finally approach the military statistics of Bulgaria, we find that in 1888 70 per cent of the army recruits could neither read nor write. Five years ago the young Bulgar soldier illiteracy had dwindled to 10 per cent, and today the Bulgar soldier is fast approaching complete literacy.

To appreciate the significance of this titanic cultural endeavor of the Bulgarian folk, one has to take note of the statistics (supplied by the U. S. Census Report) which show that the Belgian army is 8.5 per cent illiterate, the Italian 30.6 per cent, the British 13.5 per cent, and the army of fair France 3.5 per cent. The younger Bulgarian regiments are as free from illiteracy as the French. Greece,

Rumania, and Servia, whose spokesmen complacently refer to "savage Bulgaria," have systems of public education several generations old. Moreover they have an insignificant number of Moslems, illiterate or otherwise, to queer their illiteracy statistics. Yet according to the U. S. Census Report (quoted in Paul Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*, Vol. 3), 30 per cent of the Greek army recruits are illiterate and the illiteracy of the Rumanian army recruits is 64.5 per cent. The Rumanian army, which in the summer of 1913 brazenly claimed the praise of Europe for pacifying savage Bulgaria, is in fact the most illiterate army in Europe, more illiterate indeed than the army of the Czar. Even in Bulgaria the Rumanian residents are today the most ignorant non-Moslems (84.9 per cent illiterate). I have no statistics about the Servian army recruits, but the Serb population over eleven years of age shows an illiteracy of 78.9 per cent.

In one brief generation, the free Bulgarian people has made a cultural advance which challenges a parallel. In twenty years the enrollment in the Bulgarian schools trebled, and the percentage of girl pupils almost doubled. There are as few men who cannot read and write in the Bulgarian regiments formed today as there were men who could read and write in the Bulgarian regiments of thirty-five years ago.

Neither has Bulgaria's astounding progress been limited to public education. During the twenty-five years preceding the war, without augmenting her territory, she increased her railroad mileage over 883 per cent, the number of her telegraph offices more than 255 per cent, the miles of wire over 162 per cent, and the number of messages sent 343 per cent; the number of her post-offices has increased 2,149 per cent, and the pieces of mail matter handled 2,136 per cent; her imports have increased over 223 per cent, her exports almost 400 per cent, and her total foreign trade over 280 per cent; the number of vessels entering and clearing her ports has increased 2,915 per cent and their tonnage almost 1,000 per cent. What Balkan country, or indeed what country anywhere, can even approach such a record of rapid all-round progress during an equal period of time?

Nor has the Bulgarian overreached himself in his cultural endeavor. Bulgaria has shown good economic sense; she has invested her resources well. Expressed in round figures Greece had, before the war, a public debt of 162 million dollars; Servia, 132 millions; Rumania, 313 millions; Bulgaria, 122 million dollars. This means a debt of approximately 60 dollars for every Greek, 45 dollars for every Serbian, 42 dollars for every Rumanian, and 28 dollars for every Bulgar. Bulgaria has outdistanced her neighbors culturally without wrecking her credit.

Bulgaria's progress has been the progress of the mass, and has only emphasized the innate democracy of the nation. Rumania is a land of wealthy landed gentry and down-trodden serfs; Greece has rich merchants and poverty-stricken peasantry. Five-sevenths of Bulgaria's sons own the farms which they cultivate. Bulgaria has no rich classes and no poor masses. In spite of the fact that Bulgarian industry is still young, the nation has sought to anticipate the dangers and evils incidental to industrial life and so safeguard the coming generations. Woman's toil and child labor in Bulgaria have been regulated by the sort of legislation which reformers are still trying to put on the statute books of the United States. Bulgaria has no aristocracy of birth or of wealth, and it is no unusual thing for the sons of farmers to hold cabinet portfolios in Sofia.

The energetic democracy characterizing Bulgaria's education and Bulgaria's economic and political life finds also a clear expression in her racial and religious tolerance. Bulgaria is the only Balkan country in which tolerance is more than a word. The 250,000 Jews in Rumania, forming 4.3 per cent of the total population, are without any political or social rights; they are oppressed as systematically as their brothers in Russia. Religious freedom is a dead letter in the lands of Bulgaria's neighbors. Protestant missionary work is outlawed in Servia; the Bible may not be read in Greece in the vernacular, and Queen Olga precipitated a riot in Athens, which endangered the Hellenic dynasty, when she circulated the New Testament in modern Greek among the soldiers during the war of 1897.

In Bulgaria the Jew is a citizen in regular standing and can hold any office; Moslems are, and Protestants have been, members of the Sofia National Assembly; the representatives of the various religious bodies in Bulgaria (Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Moslem, Jewish) are all received on the same basis by Tsar Ferdinand. Bulgaria is the only Balkan country which has treated its Mohammedan population in such a way as to retain it, and today over half-a-million Moslems enjoy the benefits and protection of the Bulgarian government, while the Turk has fled from free Greece, Rumania, and Servia.

Bulgaria is not only a country where tolerance prevails; her truly representative electoral system places her in the vanguard of democracies. The Bulgarian voter is assured of representation in the National Assembly even if he does not choose to vote for the ticket of the strongest individual party. An electoral system, based on the principle of plurality, makes the relative predominance of a party at the polls absolute, since it delivers the total representation to the ticket receiving the largest number, but not necessarily the majority, of votes cast. This system virtually deprives the several individually weaker minorities of representation, depriving the country also of their direct contribution to its legislation. The number of Republican and Democratic representatives in Congress is not proportional to the number of Republican and Democratic voters in the land, to say nothing of the Progressives, while the million odd Socialists are without any representation in Congress at all. Bulgaria, whose political leaders have ever been inspired by America's democratic ideals, has now an electoral system which assures the proportional representation of minorities. The partisan complexion of the Bulgarian National Assembly represents with almost mathematical accuracy the actual political complexion of Bulgaria. Socialist, Agrarian, Radical, Democrat, Liberal, Nationalist—all have their representatives in the *Sobranje*, proportionate in number to their numerical strength. The Bulgarian citizen has no fear of "throwing away his vote," and therefore can vote as his political convictions urge him.

These are facts: any study at all careful of Balkan affairs will show beyond a doubt the superiority of Bulgaria's culture and Bulgaria's ideals to those of her neighbors. The Bulgarian is better educated, economically more solid, and more progressive than either the Serb, the Greek, or the Rumanian. He alone in the Balkans is truly democratic and tolerant. Can there be any doubt that Rumania's theft of the most prosperous corner of Bulgaria is a step backward from the point of view of human progress, and that the forced denationalizing of Bulgarian Macedonia by Serbia and Greece is culturally a Balkan disaster? United with the Bulgarian kingdom, the Bulgars of Macedonia would have repeated during the next twenty years the record of their kinsmen sketched above. Under the oppression of Serb and Greek, their choice is either exile or supine acceptance of a régime of intolerance and exploitation. For this reason, the summer of 1913 is a black chapter in the history of Balkan civilization, no less than in the history of the Bulgarian struggle for unification.

Obviously, then, Bulgaria cannot regard it as the final chapter. The least penetrating student of Balkan affairs should realize the provisional, the impossible character of the present Balkan settlement. The Greek arm which is stretched eastward from Salonica in front of Bulgaria's face and body outrages geography, ethnography, economics. Will it be withdrawn or will it be severed? How will Serbia fare, battling on the north with the tireless Austrian, and on the south pressed between the Bulgarian anvil and the Albanian hammer? Macedonian and Albanian revolutions bankrupted the Ottoman Empire; will the despots of Belgrade and Athens prove more successful than the Sublime Porte? Will Serbia and Greece manage to assimilate the 1,000,000 Bulgars whom they have just devoured, to say nothing of the Albanian multitudes of Kossovo and Epirus? The Bulgar natives of Macedonia are proving a fairly indigestible lot.

These questions and thoughts dominate Bulgaria's mind today, while she is doing her best to attain her belated national unification without embroiling herself in the war-

whirlpool in which her neighbor to the west is gasping. Bulgaria would regulate her conduct during the present conflict in accordance with the same conception of her rôle which sent her armies against the Turk two years ago—the rôle of an ethnically homogeneous center of Balkan democracy. To that rôle Bulgaria is predestined by her geographic position and her racial and political record. Bulgaria must bring together her folk from Ochrid to the Danube, and from Dobrudja to the Aegean, and in the life of her national unity realize the democratic ideals which she has championed throughout her history as an independent state. When the Bulgarian body, which the Berlin Congress dismembered, is once more united and healed, Bulgaria will become one of those happy states which have no history of wars and diplomatic imbroglios.

For those who know the Bulgar well, know well that he is not a conqueror by choice. The Bulgar desires so ardently what is ethnically his own simply because he desires nothing further. He is too much of a realist to entertain any illusions as to the part that, in the nature of things, he *can* play in the world drama. In that respect he is indeed a prosy rustic alongside of his neighbors, or perhaps he is better endowed with a sense of humor. For long years Rumania believed that her rapprochement with Austria had transformed the Triple Alliance into a Quadruple Alliance. The bards of Belgrade sang and sing to the tune of a dozen-millioned Serbo-Croat empire, in poetic scorn of the pertinent Viennese realities, disregarding as well the fact that the Croats of Agram speak of Belgrade as a pig-sty. And this very day, while Russ battles with Teuton for control in the Balkans, and while German submarines are challenging Britain's naval supremacy, in this war of Titans, the Nestors of Athens, without the semblance of a smile, are urging the "glorious sons of a glorious mother" to maintain the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean with special respects, not only to Constantinople, but precisely to Rome!

The real Bulgaria (as distinguished from the Bulgaria of the newspaper correspondents) is strangely out of tune

in this Balkan concert of first violins. She does not aspire to play world-politics in the see-saw manner so much in fashion at Bucharest. Bulgaria is only anxious that the world-politics prospectors should leave her in peace; she was content for many years to manage her own affairs without even Russia's diplomatic representation at Sofia. Throughout her history she has shown a decided reluctance to join European coalitions, craving cultural commerce with all European nations as emphatically as she craved entangling alliances with none (whence the tragic circumstance that, after the disaster of 1913, the abundance of calumniated Bulgaria's friends outside of European chancellories was matched only by the total absence of such friends within those diplomatic enclosures). Nor does Bulgaria care to imitate Servia and conceive her rôle as that of a South Slavonic Piedmont. Nor is she afflicted with the megalomania and imperialitis of the neo-Byzantine hosts of King Constantine. Her aim is prosaic, simple in comparison with these; it is only this: to make political Bulgaria coextensive with ethnic Bulgaria, and thus express in the social life of all Bulgars those ideals which have made one-half the Bulgar land the home of material and cultural progress, tolerance, and democracy in the Balkans.

It is precisely this conception of her national ideals which keeps Bulgaria neutral today. In the European conflict as such, the Bulgar as Bulgar can take no side; for, if Russia's objective is Constantinople, the Austro-German road to the Aegean and beyond crosses Bulgar Macedonia. Bulgaria's disinclination to aid Servia, and the menace which the champions of *Rumania irridenta* find today in Bulgaria, are both explained by the fact that these self-professed liberators of oppressed kinsmen are themselves using Romanoff methods in regions ethnically Bulgar. Bulgaria has no territorial hunger nor a militaristic thirst; her wants are purely ethnic. An understanding of this first article in the Bulgarian program will make clear what to many may have seemed an inexplicable circumstance: Bulgaria's recent rapprochement with the Sublime Porte. This rapprochement is due merely to the fact that Bulgaria has now

fewer ethnic quarrels with the Turk than with any other of her neighbors. The *Drang nach Tchatalja*, Bulgaria's solitary departure from the path she had always followed, has only confirmed her to that path. And today her military energy is not to be hired by anyone who promises to her profits at Turkey's expense; for while Turkey's loss may today be Bulgaria's gain, it cannot be Bulgaria's ethnic gain to any degree justifying the venture. Hence Bulgaria's firm intention to remain neutral, to wait for the moment when she can claim from the gods of war or peace what is ethnically hers and what alone she demands: the lands where prayers are still offered to the Bulgarian God. So long as the conflict is one of Ententes and Alliances, Bulgaria's every interest is to remain neutral, for she has no sons to waste in a world-politics quarrel. Neutrality is Bulgaria's unquestioned choice; although, to be sure, a prophet would be bold who undertook to forecast the course which any European state may have to follow before this war is over, especially a state like Bulgaria upon whom both coalitions are exercising all the pressure which solemn promises and solemn threats can bring to bear. Indeed such may be the course of this war that the very continuance of Bulgaria's neutrality may be sufficiently valuable to one or the other of the hostile groups to assure to her ethnic justice in the final settlement.

Bulgaria watches and waits for that day. They understand her ill who interpret her present stubborn neutrality as a mark of torpid indifference toward resolute action. The Bulgar is not hot-headed and quick-tempered; he can keep his head. A crisis such as Bulgaria survived in the summer of 1913 would have precipitated a revolution and a reign of terror in many European countries. The Bulgarian nation faced the tragedy with a stoicism which can not be understood, much less emulated, by a people who, like the Serbs, have managed to crowd into one short century four changes of dynasty, eight *coups d'état*, and at least four royal assassinations, and who have allowed only two of their ten rulers to die a natural death in office. The Bulgar grief is not despondency, nor is the Bulgar stolidity that of

inaction. Whether Bulgaria will attain her goal by allying herself with one of her neighbors in order to bring the rest to justice, or by joining others stronger than herself, by neutrality or by war, now or later, are questions as to how her ethnic ideal is to be realized. *That* it will be realized will cease to be a certainty only when the Chronicler has recorded the death of the race which marched from Batak to Lule Burgas in thirty-five years.